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Introduction
Marco Mariano
In the course of over ten years of research and debate sponsored by the 
Bairati Center for Euro-American Studies at the Universities of Turin and 
Eastern Piedmont on the political, social, and intellectual dimensions of 
transatlantic relations in the twentieth century, the idea of an Atlantic com-
munity has often loomed in the background, either as a historical and geo-
graphical space marked by signifi cant exchanges and interactions of ideas 
and policies, or as a political and cultural construct overlapping with “the 
West” during the cold war. The protean character and vague contours of 
this idea account for both its ubiquity in public discourse and the relative 
lack of scholarly interest in its defi nition. Historians on both sides of the 
Atlantic have often resorted to the slippery, ambiguous notion of an Atlan-
tic community as a convenient narrative device—many have assumed it as 
the obvious, natural framework of their research—but by and large, they 
have failed to consider it as a legitimate and relevant subject of inquiry. Yet 
recent developments inside and outside academia suggest that it is time to 
take this notion seriously.
The end of the cold war prompted a massive discussion about relations 
between the US and its Western European allies, which in many respects 
implies a closer and more profound look at the cultural and intellectual 
dimensions of the Atlantic liaison. While early triumphant accounts of the 
victory of what once was called the Free World hardly contributed to a crit-
ical and detached perspective, subsequent, more sober assessments of the 
present state and future challenges of “the West” have urged policy makers, 
commentators, and scholars to deal with issues that were usually taken for 
granted or conveniently ignored amidst the fog of war. Throughout four 
decades of East-versus-West ideological warfare, Western elites had invari-
ably insisted that, in addition to the negative appeal of anticommunism, a 
positive common denominator was necessary to win the hearts and minds 
of world public opinion. Now, with the demise of the Soviet threat, redefi n-
ing the meaning and rationale of the Atlantic partnership is seen as vital to 
its very survival. However, the post–cold war world has made this search 
for common ground more diffi cult than ever, due to diverging foreign policy 
agendas and expectations at the level of public opinion on both sides of the 
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Atlantic. Meanwhile, in the global arena, the emergence of new powers and 
the rise of local and global issues along the North-South axis, which are 
alien to the East-West oriented, state-based perspective of the Atlantic club, 
have contributed to speculations about an impending “end of the West.” 
On the other hand, the resilience of Atlantic institutions in a post–cold war 
order marred by widespread instability and terrorist threats could suggest 
that the Atlantic community indeed embodied not only common interests 
but also a shared identity, which apparently did not fade away with the fall 
of the Berlin Wall.
Asking whether or not we are witnessing just another family quarrel in 
the relations between the US and its European allies or if we are, in fact, on 
the verge of a deep transformational crisis with unpredictable consequences 
is beyond the scope of this work.1 The present effort was undertaken by 
historians most, though not all, historians of American foreign relations-
who assume different points of view and methodological perspectives to 
discuss one of the issues emerging from the current state of transatlan-
tic affairs, namely, the role that culture, intellectuals, and policies played 
in the defi nition of the Atlantic community. The point here is to consider 
this notion as a cultural construct, as the outcome of a deliberate effort to 
“invent” it, and as the product of genuine historical forces, policies, and 
events. Is the sense of “we-ness” based on shared traditions and values a 
mere rhetorical device aimed at legitimizing interests and policies, or is it 
rather a constitutive part of these interests and policies? Is it the expres-
sion of a “hegemonic” design by the US toward its allies? How do cultural 
and historical factors combine with political and security considerations 
to defi ne the membership of this international “community”? And to what 
extent is this community “Atlantic”? What is the relationship between a 
“community” that is historically, geographically, and politically situated 
and the universalistic values it advocates? What is its relationship with 
notions—the West, Western civilization—that are often used interchange-
ably in political discourse? And fi nally, can we simply dismiss the Atlantic 
community as a mere by-product of the cold war, or is there something 
more to be said about it?
These questions are now on the fl oor not only because it is somehow 
easier to discuss them after the end of the cold war and because they seem 
more relevant in the present, troubled situation of the Atlantic order. Two 
major developments in historical studies during the last decade—the impact 
of the “cultural turn” of so-called diplomatic history and the rise of the 
Atlantic history paradigm—also played a role. In fact, they form the major 
driving force behind this project.
The study of the history of American foreign relations, which had long 
been a stronghold of methodological conservatism, is now going through 
a time of change and openness to cutting-edge trends in the profession at 
large. While celebrations of a “renaissance” may be slightly optimistic, it is 
unquestionable that the days when the fi eld was “marking time” are gone.2 
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A major consequence of the culturalist infl uence on historical research writ 
large has been to undermine the primacy of political history. Depending 
on the attitude toward such history and the role of the state, works related 
to the new interest in culture, ideas, and foreign policy by diplomatic his-
torians as well as by scholars from other fi elds follow approximately three 
major directions. First, historians retaining the traditional focus of the fi eld 
on “power,” as well as on states and national elites as the major players in 
international relations, have incorporated “culture” and/or “ideology” as 
a vehicle of domestic and international infl uence or “hegemony.” Second, 
the cultural turn is being interpreted as an opportunity to rescue the agency 
of transnational actors from the oblivion of traditional state-centered his-
toriography. Recent studies have brought to light how private and nongov-
ernment organizations, associations, foundations, and other players affect 
international relations with varying degrees of interaction with states and 
offi cial diplomacy. Finally, a sort of middle road is being opened by schol-
ars who believe that the signifi cance of the state is a major concern for 
diplomatic historians, but at the same time expose the limits of old-school, 
US-centered narratives and call for an “internationalization” of the fi eld by 
relying on non-US sources and assuming non-US vantage points in order to 
bring into the picture multiple, previously ignored perspectives.
Such a schematic account is hardly an accurate picture of the state of the 
fi eld, but it helps explain why historians—who for many years have either 
contributed to the construction of the Atlantic community, dismissed it as 
cold-war rhetoric, or considered it irrelevant to their research—are now 
interested in the notion and in a position to decode it.3
For those who are interested in the interplay between national identity 
and foreign policy and the role of ideas as constitutive elements of hege-
monic projects at the national and international levels, a closer look at the 
construction of the Atlantic community offers plenty of food for thought. 
First, a reading of archival sources—an article of faith among diplomatic 
historians—that take “culture” seriously reveals how often the latter infl u-
enced the worldviews and the very decisions of policy makers “present at 
the creation” of the Atlantic order. Subjective assumptions about history, 
geography, status, and national identity have come together in the defi ni-
tion of prevailing notions of national interest, which were usually presented, 
and have often been studied, as the outcome of rational-choice reasoning. 
Likewise, as Andrew M. Johnston brilliantly argues, nation-states “contain 
two competing subjectivities, one as states-like-other-states, with a com-
mon interest in sovereignty and security” and the other as nations that “are 
built around particularist identities . . . constantly articulating images of 
themselves, in their history texts, political speeches, popular culture, and so 
on, in order to create the social unity needed to mobilize power for the state, 
and to differentiate between inside and outside, us and them.” In a context 
in which states follow a rational-choice approach to power and security and 
nations are constantly negotiated and contested as “imagined communities,” 
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foreign policy is best understood as a combination of both processes: the 
outcome of state bureaucracies operating under utilitarian assumptions 
believed to be universal as well as the particularist “desire to satisfy unstable 
internal arguments about the character of the nation itself.”4
In fact, the construction of an Atlantic community provides a quite 
extraordinary repository of rational considerations about national inter-
est and security, as well as symbols and metaphors that are integral to 
those considerations. However, this notion was by no means unchallenged 
in the 1940s, a time when different views of the postwar order were com-
peting for power on both sides of Atlantic. How and to what extent did 
the Atlantic community gain power and infl uence in the US and Europe? 
This is when the Gramscian notion of hegemony—by now a classic in cul-
turalist diplomatic history enters the stage. The Atlantic community fi rst 
responded to state rationality and national subjectivity in the US, the new 
hegemonic power whose national identity was being reconfi gured in the 
1940s as “a state that belonged to a political-economic community of lib-
eral-capitalist states.” At the same time, it also refl ected profound trans-
formations and contingent political agendas across the Atlantic. First, the 
idea of an international community of nations sharing not only political, 
economic and security interests but also traditions, values, and world-
views made US entanglement in European affairs at least acceptable, if 
not altogether exciting, to the American public. Henry Luce’s quest for 
US leadership of “the West” as part of the global pursuit of the American 
century is a case in point.5 Second, the projection of a communitarian, 
consensual link among like-minded peoples and nations across the Atlan-
tic alleviated European fears of an American “empire” and contained 
Americanization within the framework of Western civilization. Third, 
defi ning the West as a transatlantic community contextualized the cold-
war order within the centuries-old, familiar narrative of the East-West 
divide and made sense of the relations between “the West and the rest” 
in a truly globalized context. Finally, this notion was fl exible enough to 
allow European allies of the US to see membership in the Atlantic club as 
respondent to specifi c national needs.
From this perspective, the culturalist approach, often criticized on the 
grounds that it mostly shed light on context and representations, seems in 
fact to be equipped to tackle the issues of power and the role of states; at 
the same time, it illuminates the interaction between the latter and nonstate 
actors. Discussing the role of culture and intellectuals implies a close look 
at civil society, which is crucial for understanding how cultural constructs 
are shaped, circulated, and contested. As Edward Said wrote in Oriental-
ism, “culture . . . is to be found operating within civil society, where the 
infl uence of ideas, of institutions, and of other persons works not through 
domination but by what Gramsci calls consent.”6 The focus of this work on 
culture and intellectuals is based on this understanding of the relationship 
between culture and power.
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The cultural turn has been instrumental to the call for the internation-
alization of historical studies. The trend is especially evident in US history 
and is now percolating in the study of American foreign relations. The 
active involvement of diplomatic historians in the La Pietra project of the 
Organization of American Historians is telling evidence of the fi eld’s posi-
tive reaction to the quest for a pluralist and decentered approach to Amer-
ican power stemming from a general critique of old nationalist, insular 
narratives. At the same time, such internationalization, with a few notable 
exceptions, seems to be more of a noble dream than a consolidated practice 
for two major reasons. Multiarchival research is hindered by the fact that 
access to archives varies dramatically if we compare the situation in the US 
with that of other nations; furthermore, acquiring in-depth knowledge of 
the histories, cultures, and languages of different countries is no easy task. 
What we have, then, is the risk of “methodological regression,”7 or inter-
national history on the cheap. Furthermore, in the specifi c case of trans-
atlantic relations at mid-century, the quest for internationalization has to 
deal with the American “preponderance of power” at all levels. As Marilyn 
Young put it, “de-centering America is a good thing. But it does not of itself 
create a world free of its overwhelming military and economic power, and 
it is crucial to remember the difference or the effort to de-center American 
history will run the danger of obscuring what it means to illuminate.”8 
This is all the more so if we consider America’s infl uence abroad during 
the 1940s. Accordingly, this volume assumes the Atlantic community as 
a predominantly American product, but it also tries to illustrate how its 
construction was affected by international and transnational processes and 
how it was received in specifi c national cases.
A fi nal assumption behind this project is that the Atlantic community is 
not only a cultural construction but also a political reality based on long-
term historical trends and specifi c policies. The hegemonic power of this 
notion does not automatically deprive it of any concrete historical signifi -
cance. It is worth recalling that Said warned that “there were and are cul-
tures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives, histories, 
and customs have a brute reality obviously greater than anything that could 
be said about them in the West.” In his discussion of Western uses of his-
tory and geography in forging the Orient, he insisted that “there is no use 
in pretending that all we know about time and space, or rather history and 
geography, is more than anything else imaginative. There are such things as 
positive history and positive geography . . . ”9 Likewise, we might wonder if 
there is a “real” Atlantic community and what are its constitutive elements, 
its boundaries, and the practices that connect its members.
In fact, this project also stems from the booming interest in Atlantic 
history of the last decade. To some extent, Atlantic history is informed by 
some of the trends described earlier, namely, the critique of an exclusive 
focus on the nation-state, the attempt to bring in transnationalism, and 
fi nally, the quest for an interdisciplinary effort, especially in the fi elds of 
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history and cultural studies. To put it very simply, this approach posits that 
the Atlantic and its basin in Europe, Africa, and the Americas are parts of 
a historical and geographic unit of analysis within which a centuries-old 
exchange network of men, ideas, and goods has generated a “system,” or a 
set of interrelated systems, that is crucial for understanding the economic, 
cultural, and political history of the Atlantic area.10
If and to what extent the emergence of this paradigm can contribute 
to understanding transatlantic relations in the twentieth century, however, 
remains to be seen. Indeed, the outpouring of scholarship on the Atlantic 
world largely ignores contemporary history for two main reasons. The fi rst 
has to do with the genealogy of Atlantic history, which has been primar-
ily defi ned by historians of the transatlantic slave trade, colonial societies 
in the Americas, and empires. The methodological consequences of this 
imprinting are self-evident: the nation-state, for example, is certainly not 
a major concern for practitioners of this fi eld, yet it is fundamental for the 
study of twentieth-century transatlantic relations.
The second problem, I believe, has to do with presentism. During World 
War II and the early cold-war years, a very different strain of Atlantic his-
tory had emerged out of concerns that had more to do with the international 
political context than with the inner dynamics of the historical profession. 
When Columbia historian Carlton Hayes, in his address as president of the 
American Historical Association in 1945, advocated an “Atlantic commu-
nity” perspective on US history against what he saw as the narrow parochi-
alism of the profession, he explicitly drew on Walter Lippmann’s idea of the 
Atlantic world as a community of nations sharing both the values of “West-
ern civilization” and security interests. Ten years later, Robert Palmer and 
Jacques Godechot attempted to make a sweeping generalization of their 
Atlantic paradigm from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. They saw 
the cold war as a moment when the US and Europe were fi nally coming 
together again after the long disaffection that had followed what Palmer 
defi ned as the era of democratic revolution. As they wrote in 1955, “there 
will be a renewal in the future and a development, not only of an Atlantic 
diplomatic alliance but also of a Western or Atlantic civilization.”11
I believe that the present reluctance among historians to apply the 
Atlantic history framework to the twentieth century refl ects a widespread 
uneasiness with the presentism of that strain of Atlantic history, which was 
informed by an idea of Western civilization that “owed more to NATO 
than it did to Plato.”12 This uneasiness is largely justifi ed. In fact, history 
and cultural studies of the last decade have been successfully incorporat-
ing areas and perspectives like Africa and its relation to Europe and the 
Americas, Latin America, and the Caribbean, slavery and race, class and 
other previously ignored issues. Thanks to their efforts, the fi eld is now 
more inclusive and diverse than ever. At the same time, we might now won-
der if and to what extent we can move past the ghosts of the cold war and 
approach transatlantic relations in the twentieth century from a critical, 
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rather than apologetic, Atlantic perspective. The point here is not to “set 
the record straight,” that is, to rescue some “authentic” Atlantic/Western 
civilization from the oversimplifi ed, distorted grand narrative that Norman 
Davies has defi ned “the Allied scheme of history.”13 Rather, the point is to 
verify whether an Atlantic history paradigm can contribute to understand-
ing transatlantic relations in the twentieth century. Single contributions by 
scholars working on different topics and adopting different methodologies 
suggest that to some extent, the Atlantic basin can be seen as a unit of 
analysis far beyond the threshold of the early nineteenth century, the end of 
empires, and the wave of independence in the Americas.
At the geopolitical and economic levels, Rafe Blaufarb has shown how 
the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the Americas triggered a competi-
tion among European powers and the US for infl uence and access to mar-
kets. This had signifi cant implications for the distribution of power—at the 
international level among the major players involved and at the domestic 
level within the new Latin American republics. The impact of this “Western 
Question” on the Atlantic world, at least for the fi rst half of the nineteenth 
century, deserves further investigation.14 The integration within this world 
throughout the nineteenth century was obviously weakened by the decline 
of the slave trade, the rise of nation-states, and the divide between Ameri-
can republics and European monarchies. Still, trade continued to provide a 
major vehicle of integration in the Atlantic basin. Starting in the 1820s and 
1830s, commercial treaties allowed for the participation of Latin American 
nations in the world economy and provided a bridge over the ideological 
divide between Restoration and republicanism, while the introduction of 
steam engines paved the way toward a revolution in transatlantic transpor-
tation and communication.15
During the second half of the nineteenth century, developments within 
the US helped shape what Daniel Rodgers has described as a North Atlantic 
landscape. As steamships made transatlantic travel affordable to middle- 
and upper-class American tourists, their Grand Tour experience helped 
erode the old Republican vision of the opposition between the New World 
and the Old. Meanwhile, post–Civil War economic growth further inte-
grated the US into a “North Atlantic economy” in which similar develop-
ments typical of modern industrial societies and the exchange of goods, 
capital, management, and production techniques provided several com-
mon links between the US and Europe. “Late-nineteenth-century Essen, 
Manchester, Lille and Pittsburgh were not merely similar phenomena, not 
merely parallel independent developments. They were all part of the furi-
ously expanding world market . . . What struck those who traversed the 
industrial regions of the Old and the New Worlds was not their difference 
but their extraordinary sameness.”16 These developments might be usefully 
tackled as part of the broader issue of distinct but analogous “trajectories 
of modernization” within the “Atlantic system,” although efforts in this 
direction are infrequent.17
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Finally, with turn-of-the-century Anglo-American rapprochement, 
“identities of opposition gradually gave way to narratives of compatibil-
ity” between the US and Europe in international relations as well. Charles 
Kupchan has argued that the early decades of the twentieth century saw a 
transition from “militarized rivalry” to “peaceful coexistence,” which was 
an important step toward the “cooperative security” inaugurated in the 
1940s.18
While these assumptions inform the choice to discuss the “Atlantic com-
munity” mostly, though not exclusively, from the perspective of culture 
and ideas, they by no means refl ect the methodological orientations of all 
the contributors to this volume. In fact, Defi ning the Atlantic Commu-
nity brings together scholars from varied backgrounds and methodological 
approaches who offer different, and at times divergent, perspectives on the 
notion of Atlantic community.
The fi rst part focuses on American policy makers, intellectuals, and 
their ideas, with an emphasis on how domestic factors and internal devel-
opments shaped an Atlantic vision of Europe within the US. Ronald Steel 
discusses the crucial role that leading columnist and public intellectual 
Walter Lippmann played in the construction of Atlantic community as a 
concept that reinterpreted US relations with Europe and redefi ned the West 
as a US-led “sphere of infl uence.” Frank Ninkovich assesses postwar US 
attitudes and policies toward Europe in the light of prewar intellectual tra-
ditions of US foreign policy; he argues that nineteenth-century liberalism, 
more than Wilsonianism, accounts for the US tendency to situate relations 
with Europe within a global framework. Emiliano Alessandri explores 
how religion contributed to the cultural construction of the Atlantic com-
munity and argues that “Christian Atlanticism” as a religious interpreta-
tion of American internationalism should not dismissed as a by-product of 
the cold war. Finally, Marco Mariano discusses the Atlantic community 
as a metageographic concept illustrating a shift in the place of the US in 
world affairs―a shift that tracked changes in national identity in wartime 
America.
The second part is devoted more closely to the interaction between the 
New World and the Old, as it deals with policies and narratives—mostly, 
but not exclusively, originating in the US and targeting Europe—that were 
relevant to the construction of a “European Atlantic community.” Mau-
rizio Vaudagna analyzes ideas about and policies on “social protection” 
as a constitutive element of the Atlantic community during World War II, 
and emphasizes how Western powers struggled to “steal the thunder” of 
social security from antidemocratic traditions of social welfare. David Ell-
wood situates the conceptualization of the Atlantic community within the 
context of American geopolitical grand narratives and compares its effec-
tiveness with that of the Marshall Plan as a vehicle of US “soft power” in 
Europe throughout the postwar years, with a coda on contemporary devel-
opments in transatlantic relations. Giles Scott-Smith looks at the activism 
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of intellectuals engaged in the battleground of ideas in the early cold-war 
years. He focuses on the case of Congress for Cultural Freedom as a vehicle 
for the exercise of US hegemony in Europe and for the nurturing of a trans-
atlantic elite within the context of “American empire.”
Finally, the third part examines how the idea of Atlantic community 
was received, negotiated, and contested outside the US by discussing four 
national cases located in very different positions along the center/periph-
ery spectrum of the Atlantic world. Kathleen Burk discusses Britain as the 
primus inter pares among the European allies of the US who looked with 
skepticism at the American idea of Atlantic community, and shows how the 
British evolved the belief that their national interests would be best served 
if Britain acted as a bridge between two worlds, rather than as a member 
of an integrated Euro-American entity. At the opposite end of the Atlantic 
spectrum, Mario Del Pero explains that Italy sought acceptance within the 
Atlantic club as an “emancipative bond,” that is, a source of security that 
was crucial to restoring its sovereignty after fascism and the defeat in World 
War II. Yuichi Hosoya illustrates how mutual security concerns gradually 
led the US and Japan toward an arrangement that virtually transformed 
the latter into an outpost of “the West” in the Far East/Pacifi c region in 
the context of the global cold war. Finally, Loris Zanatta, arguing from the 
South Atlantic viewpoint of Argentina, discusses how Juan Domingo Peron 
tried to develop a “third position,” that is, a Catholic, Latin, and Hispanic 
alternative to the Anglo-Saxon Atlantic community.
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